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Paper No. 1 
SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE UKRAINE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Bohdan R. Bociurkiw* 
Carleton University 
In retrospect, Soviet religious policy in the Ukraine has to be 
viewed from two main vantage points: The first is that of the centrally 
formulated program on religion which the regime attempted to implement through­
out the USSR; the second vantage point is that of the peculiar ecclesiastical 
situation and the nationality and peasant problems in the Ukraine which led 
to modifications and occasional aberrations in the application of this central 
church policy to Ukrainian conditions. In analysing these twin facets of the 
regime's ecclesiastical policy in this second-largest Union Republic, we shall 
focus mainly on its majority denomination -- the Orthodox Church -- which during 
most of the inter-war period was split into three major groupings -- the 
Patriarchal
1 and the Renovationist2 Churches (the local extensions of "All­
Union" churches), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC)3. 
Since World War II, our discussion will also involve the Greek Catholic (Uniate) 
Church in the Western Ukraine. 
I 
In terms of its ultimate objectives and long-range policies on 
religion, the Soviet regime has displayed a striking consistency in aiming 
at the complete elimination of religion in the USSR in both its institutional 
and its subjective, psychological aspects. The invariability of the regime's 
position on this point can easily be traced to the Leninist variety of Marxism 
with its commitment to "militant atheism" rather than the slow-working, social-
economic mechanisms of secularization. At no time, since 1917, has this view 
of religion been effectively challenged within the Bolshevik Party, and no 
departure from this long-range objective can be detected in the Soviet church 
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to the Canadian Institue of 
Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta in Edmonton and the Shevchenko 
Foundation in Winnipeg for their support of research leading to this publication. 
A brief biographical note about the author is provided at the end of the paper 
on p. 16. 
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·policy in the Ukrainian SSR. 
However, in their choice of means designed to realize this ultimate 
goal and in the timing and application of their short-term relgious policies 
to individual churches, nationalities, social strata and regions, the Bolsheviks 
have shown both considerable flexibility and contradictory tendencies. To be 
sure, the regime's guide in translating long-term policy into a short-term 
tactical line has been the Leninist formula subordinating the antireligious 
4 struggle to the larger political and economic objectives of the Party. However, 
differences over the interpretation of these major objectives and their successive 
re-interpretations have allowed for considerable vacillation between the two 
extremes: the "leftist, " "anarchist" tendency stressing violence and "administra-
tive methods" in suppressing religion; and the "rightist, " "opportunistic"tendency 
-advo��ting:reliance on the anti-religious effects of objective,. socio-economic 
processes. 
Accordingly, two not entirely consistent trends can be detected in the 
Soviet church policy. On one hand, at least until 1938, the Bolshevik leaders 
pursued a line aiming at the progressive weakening, strangulation, and destruction 
of organized religion in the USSR, alternating increasingly severe repressions 
with periods of relatively relaxed pressure whenever accumulating resentment 
on the part of the believers or hostile reaction abroad threatened the political 
or economic position of the regime. On the other hand, however, the Bosheviks 
persistently strove to "Sovietize" the religious organizations, not merely for 
the sake of e stablishing official control over the internal affairs of these 
organizations, but in order to use them for the purposes of both domestic and 
foreign policy and propaganda. The advent of the "New Religious Policy" 
with the outbreak of World War II marked the beginning of a shift in Soviet 
emphasis, from the destruction of religion to its exploitation as a political 
weapon, e specially in the area of foreign relations and propaganda - a tendency 
which was not abandoned after Stalin's death despite a marked intensification 
of antireligious pressures in the USSR. 
These two trends in the Soviet church policy have had their spokesmen 
from the very beginning of the Bolskevik regime: the "fundamentalists" (especially 
vocal in the Komsomol and, obviously, the League of Militant Atheists (S. V.B. ) ,  
arguing against any official distinctions between the religious groups and 
advocating an indiscriminate struggle against all forms of religion; and the 
"pragmatists, " to be found among "practical" state officials and the secret 
police -- who were favoring the tactic of "rewarding the friends and punishing 
the enemies", varying the treatment of the individual religious groups in 
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accordance with their respective attitudes towards the regime and the kind of 
contribution they could offer to the achievement of Soviet goals. Indeed, 
it could be argued that these two positions complemented rather than excluded 
each other, for the repressive measures against religious groups "conditioned" 
them into plain tools of the official policy, just as the constant threat to 
resume such repressions helped to dissuade them from using the concessions 
obtained from the regime for purposes unacceptable to the Kremlin. 5 
II 
The arrival of the Soviet power in the Ukraine in 1919-20 brought 
it face to face with a complex ecclesiastical situation which defied a simple, 
clear-cut solution. Neither their ideological arsenal nor their recent experience 
with the church-state conflict in Russia had equipped the Bolsheviks with a 
ready-made, tested solution to the church problem in the Ukraine. At the 
heart of this problem was a rampant religious nationalism, manifested in the 
two-year old Russo-Ukrainian struggle for control of the local Orthodox Church. 
The roots of this struggle reached far back into Ukrainian history to the 
traditional Orthodox pattern of church- state "symphony," the merger of religious 
and national consciousness in the Cossack Ukraine, the subsequent imposition 
of Moscow's ecclesiastical supremacy over the Kievan Church and its transformation 
by the nineteenth century into an instrument of national and social oppression. 
It was inevitable that, with the resurgence of Ukrainian nationalism its demands 
for emancipation from Moscow came to be projected onto the ecclesiastical sphere. 
as well. First assuming an organized form with the 1917 revolution and attracting 
into its ranks elements of radical and reformist clergy and laymen, the 
Ukrainian church movement challenged the Russian leadership of the Orthodox 
Church in the Ukraine during 1917-18, demanding the introduction of Ukrainiani-
zation, conciliar administration, and autocephaly, Denied, however, any 
effective or timely assistance from the short-lived national Ukrainian government 
and encountering uniform hostility from the church hierarchy in the Ukraine, the 
movement failed to achieve a canonical realization of its goals. In frustration, 
it turned in 1919 to more radical means -- by taking over and "Ukrainianizing" 
individual church parishes from below and bringing them under the jurisdiction 
of the All-Ukrainian Church Rada(councii} 6 in defiance of the local Russian 
episcopate. Not yet significant numerically, largely confined to Kiev and 
a few other urban centers, the Ukrainian church movement nevertheless found 
ethusiastic support among the Ukrainian intelligentsia and could count upon 
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a broad base of support among the Ukrainian peasantry in the future. 
On the other side of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical "front" was 
the predominantly Russian episcopate, equally nationalistic in attitudes, 
still in firm control of the Church, protecting the status quo with canonical 
barriers and dismissing the demands of the Ukrainian church movement as 
"unchurchly, "  "s. eparatist" designs upon the unity of the Church and "Holy 
Russia". In the background, wavering between their dislike of the conservative 
rule of the monastic bishops and their distrust of Ukrainian nationalism, were 
a handful of local church "liberals" and "reformists, " defeated by the conserva­
tive majority at the 1918 All-Russian Sobor, largely deserted by-th�ir Ukrainian 
following which now joined the national church movement. 
With the Bolsheviks entering the Ukrainian scene in 1919, the 
configuration of the forces that were to dominate the ecclesiastical life 
of the Soviet Ukraine for the next two decades took final shape. Poised 
against each other and yet drawn into passing tactical alignments, reaching 
for support into different strata of Ukrainian society, were the Ukrainian 
and Russian nationalisms, ecclesiastical liberalism, and the atheistic regime 
holding, by its preponderance of physical power, the key to the respective 
fates of the other three contenders for the spiritual allegiance of Ukrainian 
population. 
III 
From 1919 on, five principal considerations evidently entered into 
the formulation and execution of Soviet church policy in the Ukraine; the 
respective weight of each of these considerations depended on the changing 
balance of power at the center and in the Soviet Ukrainian leadership, the 
larger policy objectives of the moment, and the contingencies of the situation 
in the Ukraine. One of these considerations, of course, was the militant 
atheism inherent in the Marxist-Leninist world-view and intensified by the 
traditional hostility of the Russian Left towards the established Church 
as the chief ideologist and potent political instrument of the Tsarist 
autocracy. Another, indeed the overriding, determinant of the religious 
policy was the political survival of the Soviet regime in the Ukraine. 
Closely connected with the latter were two other considerations: the delicate 
and yet acute national question arising from the national and social alie­
nation of the new regime from the majority of the population; and the related 
... 
peasant problem deriving from the absolute numerical predominance of this 
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traditionally religious stratum of Ukrainian society, the peasants' 
national-cultural aspirations, and the vital importance of Ukrainian 
agriculture to the Soviet economy. Finally, the anticipated or 
perceived foreign reaction to Soviet policies on religion and the possible 
advantage of employing churches for external propaganda purposes also 
influenced Soviet policy makers, particularly in restraining their antire-
ligious zeal. The varying weight given at different times to these 
considerations by the regime in its treatment of the chief ecclesiastical 
factions in the Ukraine, makes it possible to identify the several stages 
of Soviet church policy in the Ukraine, roughly coinciding with the six 
major periods of Soviet political history: the Civil war; the NEP; Stalin's 
'second revolution from above'� the 'Great Retreat' since the outbreak of 
World War II until Stalin's death; Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization"; and the 
post-1964 restoration of bureaucratic stability under the Brezhnev rule. 
IV 
During the first three years of the Soviet rule (19 19-1921), the 
immediate problem of political survival overshadowed all other considerations 
underlying the regime's religious policy in the Ukraine. The well known 
hostility of the Russian Orthodox Church towards the Bolsheviks, collaboration 
of its leading hierarchs with the Volunteer Army, and its open defiance of the 
Soviet decrees on religion made the former Established Church the main target 
of the Communist antireligious measures. It was primarily to weaken and split 
the Russian Church, and not because of any sympathies for the Ukrainian church 
movement that the latter initially received qualified support from the authorit­
ies in its efforts to resurrect a national Ukrainian church,7 the efforts which 
by October 1 921 culminated in the formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church (UAOC), canonically and hierarchically separate from the 
Russian and other Orthodox Churches.
8 
But the hopes which the Bolsheviks 
may have had that the UAOC would evolve into a "progressive", "Living", 
"Soviet" church never materialized. Before long, the phenomenal growth 
of the new church, its intensely national orientation, and its appeal to 
those strata of Ukrainian society which would not accept the new regime or 
were not acceptable to the latter, evoked, in the eyes of the Party and the 
GPU, a spectre of a "Petliurite-kulak counterrevolution" in ecclesiastical 
- 9 disguise. 
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From 1922 on, the authorities centered their efforts on the 
implantation in the Ukraine of a collaborationist "Living Church" (later 
"Renovationist Church"10), after the latter managed to seize, with the help 
from the police, the Patriarchal administration in Moscow. To this end, 
massive propaganda and administrative measures were employed to break the 
resistance of the Patriarchal Church in the Republic. Meanwhile, unable 
to force the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church into a merger with the Renovationists, 
the authorities attempted to launch a "progressive revolution" within the 
UAOC by manipulating factional and personal tensions in the Autocephalist 
11 
ranks. Having failed again, the authorities turned to administrative and 
police repressions against the UAOC. In 1923, the Church's leading organ -
the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council - was declared illegal an� in 192� 
the GPU arrested Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi and a number of other Auto­
cephalist leaders. In the meantime, the government-supported Renovationist 
Church in the Ukraine proclaimed a token autocephaly in the hope of attracting 
followers from the ranks of the UAOc.12 
The continued unpopularity of the Renovationists among the rank­
and-file believers led the regime to shift its tactics in the direction of 
the "Sovietization" of the Patriarchal and Autocephalous Churches in the 
Ukraine. In July 19 27, after repeated arrests, the Acting Patriarchal 
Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergii, issued his well known Declaration pledging 
on behalf of the Russian Church an unconditional loyalty to the Soviet State; 
this act of submission to the new regime restored legal status to the Patriarchal 
Church in the Ukraine. At the same time, under police threats and promises 
of concessions, the 1927 Sober of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church dismissed 
Metropolitan Lypkivskyi and other "politically compromised" Autocephalist 
leaders. Under its new canonical head, Metropolitan Mykolai Boretskyi, the 
UAOC pledged itself to a loyal but apolitical course and accepted a much more 
pervasive governmental control over its activities.1 3  
Limited concessions secured by the Patriarchal and Autocephalous 
churches in the Ukraine in return for "normalization" of their relations with 
the state, proved to be short-lived. By the end of 1928, a major turning point 
was reached by the Soviet religious policy, as the Stalin regime embarked on a 
massive attack against the "survivals" of the old social-economic order and 
culture. Simultaneously with its collectivization drive, the Party opened 
a broad, frontal attack against all religious groups in the country, including 
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the hitherto favourized "Renovationists". In the Ukraine, where "bourgeois 
nationalism" was now recognized as the "greater danger" (than the "great power 
chauvinism" of the Russians), the main blows were aimed at the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Church as perhaps the most massive institutional expression of 
popular "Uk.rainization" movement. l4 By early 19 30, approximately three-fourths 
of the Autocephalist parishes were suppressed by the authorities; a number of 
bishops and lay leaders of the UAOC were arrested by the GPU �n fabricated 
charges of "counterrevolutionary activities", with the authorities denouncing 
the Autocephalous Church as allegedly a branch of the recently "unmasked" 
"Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" (SVU).15 Without waiting for the 
show trial of the "Union", the GPU hastened to stage the so-called "Extraordinary 
Sobor" of the UAOC in January 19 30, which "voted" for "self-dissolution" of the 
Church16 as a "nationalist, political, counter-revolutionary organization. "!? 
Nevertheless, in December 19 30,remnants of the UAOC were allowed to 
reorganize under a new name as the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church", now headed by 
Metropolitan Ivan Pavlovskyi of Kharkiv. The new church organization had to 
dissociate itself formally from the three principles of the UAOC--autocephaly, 
Uk.rainianization and conciliar self-government--and to commit its members to 
18 Soviet patriotism and an unconditional loyalty to the regime. This involuntary 
"Sovietization" did not save Metropolitan Pavlovskyi's Church; by 1 9 36 the 
authorities suppressed, in Kharkiv, the last parish of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church, imprisoning its remaining bishops, including Pavlovskyi. Early in 
19 38, the NKVD arrested the now retired Metropolitan Lypkivskyiwho, too, was 
19 never to be heard from again. 
The Great Purges of 19 3 7- 38, virtually destroyed also the Patriarchal 
and Renovationist organizations in the Ukraine leaving behind only a handful of 
scattered and unorganized local parishes. Completely shattered were the Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, and Judaic communities. 
While the entire hierarchy of all three Orthodox factions in the 
Ukraine had been wiped out by 19 38, the Patriarchate and the Renovationist 
Synod in Russia escaped anihillation. This seeming inconsistency may be 
explained at least in two ways. Firstly, with foreign opinion focusing its 
attention on developments at the center, the survival of and suitable pronounce­
ments by the leaders of the Patriarchate and the Synod could demonstrate to the 
world the continued "freedom of conscience" in the USSR. Secondly, both of the 
"controlled churches"--but especially the Patriarchal Church, even if reduced to 
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20 skeleton apparatus --could prove useful in facilitating Soviet control 
over the still-large believing portion of the population and in promoting 
the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet government, especially in dealing 
with the churches outside the Soviet Union. 
v 
Though the period of Stalin's "New Religious Policy" is usually 
dated from the celebrated meeting of Stalin and Molotov with the three senior 
hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate in September, 1943, 21 it is clear that 
the genesis of this paradoxical "symphony" between the remnants of the Russian 
Orthodox Church and the atheist regime goes back at least to 1939. It was 
the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland and MOscow's annexation of the Western 
regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia, followed by the occupation of Bukovyna, 
Bessarabia and the Baltic States--that gave a new lease on life to the near 
moribund Moscow Patriarchate. Suddenly, the Kremlin found political use for 
the intimidated loyal churchmen as instruments of Sovietization and Russification 
of the numerous and vigorous Orthodox communities in the newly annexed territories. 
Through the extension of the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction over the dioceses 
in the annexed areas, the latter were to be purged of disloyal or suspect leaders; 
the emissaries of the Patriarchate were entrusted with the job of policing the 
"reunited" church organization so as to prevent it from offering asylum to the 
dislodged anti-Soviet political forces, especially in the Western Ukraine with 
its history of intense Ukrainian nationalism. Accordingly, during 1939-41, 
Patriarchal exarchs Panteleimon Rozhnovskii and Nikolai Iarushevich carried 
out, with the regime blessings, "reunion" of the Volyn and Polissia dioceses, 
eliminating the Ukrainian language from liturgical usage, and even laying out 
22 
plans for the future "conversion" of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics in Galicia, 
The Kremlin's shift towards a more pragmatic religious policy was 
nevertheless of a limited and tentative nature. No concessions were extended 
to the Church in the "old" Soviet territories: by June 1941, probably no more 
than one dozen Orthodox churches remained open in the Ukrainian SSR east of the 
Zbruch river. Nor were the Western oblasti spared from exposure to vulgar 
anti-religious propaganda, Within months of Soviet invasion, all landed 
property of churches and monasteries was confiscated; theological schools, 
religious publications, charitable institutions and lay organizations were 
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summarily suppressed, and all Catholic monasteries and convents were dis-
banded in the Western Ukraine. Excessive, discriminatory taxation was 
imposed upon the clergy and a number of them were arrested, deported or 
executed.23 Nevertheless, for the time being, the new authorities stopped 
short of implementing in the Western oblasti some of the most destructive 
provisions of Soviet ecclesiastical legislation, most likely due to their 
still insecure position in the occupied territories and their growing anxiety 
about the Nazi designs upon the USSR. 
The major turning point came with the German invasion of the USSR 
in June 1941. The spontaneous revival of religious life in the Ukraine and 
other Nazi-occupied territories was undoubtedly one of several factors that 
led Stalin's regime to suspend antireligious propaganda and to allow limited 
restoration of church organization and religious activities in the Soviet-held 
areas, especially those threatened by further German advance. At the same time, 
war crisis made it imperative for the Kremlin to seek support from all sections 
of Soviet population, including the masses of the long persecuted believers. 
The regime's appeals to Russian nationalism, the rehabilitation of the old 
Tsarist symbols and heroes for the purposes of the "Great Patriotic War" made 
it easier for the Russian Orthodox Church to rationalize its new alliance with 
the Soviet Government, while the latter could now more readily rely on the loyal 
Church as an instrument of national policy and external propaganda. The process 
of reconciliation between the Patriarchate and the Kremlin culminated by 
September 1943 in a whole range of concessions given to the Russian Orthodox 
Church: the latter was now accorded a paradoxical position of a "quasi­
established church" in an atheist state, including direct access to Soviet 
leaders, a separate agency for the management of its relations with the 
Government (all other recognized churches were placed under a separate "Council 
for the Affairs of Religious Cults"), exclusive right to "missionary" activit­
ies among the non-Orthodox believers, as well as the permission to reopen a 
number of theological and monastic institutions (and to retain those found in 
the reoccupied territories) on a scale denied to any other beneficiary of 
Stalin's "new religious policy." Secretly in 1945, the Church was restored 
juridical rights, including the right to own property, but with a significant 
exception of the houses of worship and their contents.24 
The developments in the Ukraine after it was retaken by the Soviet 
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armies in 1943-44 offered the most striking demonstration of the overlapping 
interests of the Russian Church and the Soviet State. The two joined in the 
liquidation of the remnants of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church 
which was revived during the German occupation; the Autoc�phalist parishes 
were taken over by the Russian Church while the state authorities took care 
of the "recalcitrant" clerics. The Moscow Patriarchate welcomed back into 
its ranks the remaining episcopate and clergy of the pro-Russian Autonomous 
Church in the Ukraine, granting immunity from prosecution to those "reunited" 
churchmen who happened to collaborate with the German occupation authorities. 
By 19 45, following a meeting between Stalin and the newly elected 
Patriarch Alexii, the state and the Church joined in a massive assault against 
the central national institution in Galicia and Transcarpathia--the Greek 
Catholic (Uniate) Church, in a pattern closely resembling the Tsarist suppres-
sion of the Uniates in the 1830s. Soviet anti-Uniate propaganda was syn-
chronized with the Patriarchate's appeals to the Ukrainian Catholics to aban­
don Rome. As the entire Uniate episcopate was arrested in April 1 9 4 5, the 
Russian Church dispatched its bishop to Lviv to mastermind the so-called 
"reunion" campaign. With the decisive assistance from the administration, 
the secret police and the military a pseudo-Sobor was staged in Lviv, in March 
1946, to supply a semblance of a "voluntary" and "canonic" dissolution of 
the Union with Rome and the so-called "return" of the Uniates to the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Numerous Greek Catholic priests who could not be persuaded 
by Orthodox and police "missionaries" were given lengthy prison and forced 
labor camp sentences for their alleged "bourgeois nationalist" and pro-German 
. . . d i h 25 act1v1t1es ur ng t e war. 
To the Russian Church the ecclesiastical conquest of the Western 
Ukraine meant the realization of its long-standing objectives of bringing all 
Eastern Slavs under the Moscow Patriarchal See. To the Soviet authorities, 
the destruction of the Uniate Church appeared to be an integral part of their 
battle against formidable Ukrainian nationalist resistance in Galicia, as well 
as a major step towards the cultural integration of the Western Ukraine in the 
Soviet Russian empire. To be sure, the formal "reunion" of the Ukrainian 
Uniates completed by 1949, with the suppression of the Union in Transcarpathia, 
was more apparent than real; while the decimated Greek Catholic Church was left 
with an aura of martyrdom that helped it to retain the loyalties of the West 
Ukrainian believers, no amount of propaganda could "legitimatize" the Russian 
Church in the eyes of its involuntary "converts", with most of the "reunited" 
·--
- 1 1  -
·clergy remaining Catholic in pectore. 
The Russian Orthodox Church was the principal but not the only 
beneficiary of Stalin's religious NEP in the Ukraine. Several Protestant 
groups were allowed to resume their activites, though at a price of merging 
into the government-supervised Union of the Evangelical Christians (and] 
Baptists (ECB). Separate Ukrainian Protestant organizations which existed 
in the Western Ukraine prior to Soviet annexation were suppressed and their 
flock forced into the new Union. The Seventh Day Adventists and Hungarian 
Calvinists were being tolerated by the authorities, but not those Pentecostalists 
who refused to give up "speaking in tongues" or the "subversive" Jehovah's 
Witnesses. After the repatriation of most Poles from the Western Ukraine, 
only small number of Roman Catholic parishes were permitted to continue, but 
without a bishop or even a vicar general of their own. The survivors of the 
Nazi Holocaust were able to reopen a number of synagogues and minyamins in 
the Republic; by 1949, following the suppression of all secular Jewish organ­
izations, they remained the only institutional expressions of Jewish culture. 
Compared with other Union Republics, the post-war l*raine displayed the great-
est diversity and concentration of religious communities in the USSR. Though 
accounting for only 19% of the total population, the Ukrainian SSR contained 
the majority of all Orthodox and Pentecostalist congregations and approximately 
one half of the Evangelical-Baptist communities.26 
Before long, however, the regime began to tighen up screws on religious 
activities. Already in 1944, a Central Committee resolution ordered the Party 
to resume what has then been euphemistically described as "propaganda of natural-
scientific vie�vs." By 194 7, the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of 
Political and Scientific Knowledge (renamed later Society "Knowledge") was 
explicitly entrusted with the task of "scientific atheist" propaganda. From 
1948 on, virtually no new churches, monasteries or theological school would 
be allowed by the authorities. Apparently, the regime had now less use for 
the Russian Church and other "loyal" denominations as instruments of political 
integration and external propaganda. 
VI 
Stalin's death and the subsequent emergence of Nikita Khrushchev 
as the dominant figure in the ruling oligarchy, could not but affect the 
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future course of Soviet church policy. As the new leadership undertook 
selective de-Stalinization, Stalin's "new religious policy" undoubtedly 
came under review. The short-lived anti-religious campaign of 1954 with 
its two conflicting Central Committee resolutions27 very likely reflected 
the still unresolved differences within the Kremlin over this aspect of 
Stalin's legacy. Khrushchev's victory over the so-called "Anti-Party 
Group," signalled the beginning of a new, "fundamentalist" stage in Soviet 
religious policy, in line with the Khrushchevite "return to Leninism" 
campaign, and the new emphasis on the mass resocialization measures to 
compensate for the weakening of coercive social controls. 
Coinciding with the announced start of "the building oL'Communism," 
massive and occassionally violent anti-religious campaign began in 1958.
28 
The "loyal" religious leaders were now compelled by the regime not only 
"voluntarily" to restrict the activities of their denominations and to 
close down the majority of churches, theological and monastic institutions, 
but also to reassure the world outside that there was absolutely no truth 
in the multiplying reports about the new persecution of religion in the 
Soviet Union. Servility and lying did not help the official religious 
leaders to protect their respective churches from massive loses, while at 
the same time they seriously eroded the credibility they have had in the 
eyes of the harassed believers. Along with the gross violations of legality 
accompaning the mass "deregistration" of congregations and the clergy, this 
loss of trust in the state-approved church leaders contributed to the emergence 
of religious dissent movements, at first among the Evangelical Christians 
[and) Baptists, and the Orthodox, later in other denominations as we11. 29 
In the Ukraine, about one-half of churches were closed in the 
course of the 1958-1964. The number of Orthodox parishes in the Republic 
was reduced from a 1950 total of some 8,ooo30to 4,500, by 1976,31 amounting 
to 65% of all "registered" churches in the USSR.32 The greatest losses 
were suffered by dioceses located in the eastern regions of the Ukr. SSR; 
e.g. , the number of Orthodox churches in the Poltava-Kremenchuk diocese 
fell between 1958 and 1964 from 340 to mere 52.
33 
Two out of the three 
Orthodox seminaries in the Ukraine (in Kiev and Lutsk) were closed down. 
34 
The only surviving theological school, in Odessa (118 students in 1974-75 ), 
has been able to fill in only part of the vacancies in the ranks of the 
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parish clergy. Of the 1 34 new clergymen ordained for the Ukraine 
during 19 74,35 the larger part must have graduated from the theological 
schools in Leningrad (which has had a disproportionately high percentage 
of Ukrainian students) and Hoscow. As most applicants to theological 
seminaries come from the Western Ukrainian dioceses (and many of them are 
suspected by the authorities of harbouring Ukrainian nationalist sentiments 
or even of being secret Uniates), the Council for Religious Affairs introduced 
a restrictive quota for admission of Hest Ukrainians to all theological school�. 36 
Khrushchev's antireligious campaign was particularly destructive 
3 7  of monasticism in the l�raine. O f  the 3 8  monasteries and convents, 29 were 
closed do�vn, including the Kievo-Pecherska Lavra (the Kievan monastery of the 
Caves)-- the oldest and most revered monastery in the land. Reporting, in 
19 75, to the CPSU Central Committee about the C. R. A. activities, its vice­
chairman V. Furov admitted that: 
Guided by instructions from the leading (direktivnye) organs, 
considerable work was carried out locally during the last years 
to reduce the netwo�k of monasteries. To this very end, the 
Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church the(Eredecessor 
of C. R. A J used also its increased influence on the Patriarchate and 
the bishops. With the hands of the churchmen, several tens of 
monasteries [and conventJ were closed down. In 1963, under a use-
ful pretext (landslides in the caves, the necessity to examine the 
soil and make repairs), the Kievo-Pecherska Lavra was closed: it 
38 
used to attract each year close to 500,000 pilgrims. 
Only 9 monastic institutions survived in the l&raine (16 in the entire 
USSR): monasteries in Pochaiv (with 45 monastics in 19 70) and Odessa (39); 
and seven convents (including two in Kiev) with a 19 70 total of 755 nuns and 
novices. 39 since the late 19 50's severe restrictions have also been imposed 
on admissions to monasteries and convents, their activities and income, and 
the accessibility of monastic shrines to pilgrims. 40 
Paradoxically, "de-Stalinization" which so detrimentally affected 
the once privileged "patriotic" Church, brought some benefits to the largest 
of the banned churches--the l&rainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church. Though 
the authorities ignored numerous Uniate appeals for the rehabilitation of their 
Church, Khrushchev's penal reforms enabled a number of the Ukrainian Catholic 
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priests who have refused "conversion" to Orthodoxy--those who survived 
their lengthy imprisonment and exile--to return to the Western Ukraine. 
41  
Among them were two surviving bishops of the martyr Church, under whose 
guidance the Catacomb Church was able significantly to revive its activities 
in Galicia • Though the imprisoned Primate of the Church, Metropolitan 
. Josyf Slipyj was not allowed to rejoin his flock, in early 19 63, he was 
released from imprisonment and sent away from the USSR in response to 
Papal-American intervention on his behalf, a consession which Khrushchev 
hoped would encourage further development of detente between the Vatican 
and the Krem�in.42 
VII 
Khrushchev's sudden removal in Fall 1964 soon brought to halt 
the country-wide attack on religion. Though the new "collective leader-
ship" would not restore to religious organizations their lost rights, churches, 
monasteries, and theological schools, from now on the emphasis of Soviet 
church policy was to be on gradual, more subtle and indirect attack on 
institutional religion. The emphasis was now to be placed primarily on 
atheist "conversion" of the flock and the replacement of religious holidays, 
rites and ceremonies with Communist substitutes, with the natural attrition 
of the clergy expected to progressively shrink the churches' institutional 
base. 
Despite the losses suffered by religious groups in the Republic, the 
Ukraine has retained after 1964 its predominant share of religious congrega-
tions in the USSR. Within the Republic, its Western oblasti with 20% of popu-
-
lation now held over 60% of all Orthodox congregations as the authorities were 
reluctant to close many churches in areas where their flock may rejoin the banned 
Uniate Church; at the same time, the concentration of anti-religious measures 
primarily on urban areas has restricted Orthodox Church mainly to rural areas 
where 98% of all still open churches were now located.4
3 
This shift in its 
regional and social base has had somewhat unexpected ethno-cultural consequences 
for the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine; it now made it dependent on the 
Ukrainian peasant strata, least affected by Russification, and on the Western 
Ukraine, with its intensely nationalistic population. Not accidentally, the 
once solidly Uniate Lviv-Ternopil diocese with its 9 58 churches and 609 priests 
in 1 9 78, represents the largest (and least decimated during 1958-64) 
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diocese of the entire Orthodox Church in the USSR.
4 4  
To adjust to its changed social base, the Russian Orthodox 
Church in the Ukraine had to undergo limited Ukrainianizationta process 
which has been associated since 1966 with the activities of the new Patriarchal 
Exarch of the Ukraine, Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko (*1929), the first 
Ukrainian in more than 150 years to be apnointed Metropolitan of Kiev and 
Halych. During his tenure, the Orthodox episcopate in the Republic became 
predominantly Ukrainian, with more than half of bishops recruited from the 
45 
Western oblasti which were annexed since Horld War II. Since 1968, the 
Exarchate has resumed publication of its l�rainian-language monthly, 
Pravoslavnyi visnyk (The Orthodox Herald), suppressed during Khrushchev's 
antireligious campaign; it has also produced a l�rainian prayer book, and 
started annual publication of Ukrainian Orthodox calendars. It appears 
that the continuing threat faced by the official Orthodox Church from the 
46 catacomb Uniate Church in the Western Ukraine, Moscow's hopes for the 
enentual "reunion" of the Ukrainian Orthodox abroad, and the Patriarchate's 
desire to neutralize the influence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the 
West have supplied additional motives for this limited ecclesiastical 
Ukrainization. It is important to note, however, that this Ukrainianization 
tendency has not touched the sole surviving theological seminary in Odessa,
4 7 
that Russian language still prevails in sermons and church administration 
in city churches outside the Western oblasti, and that even in these oblast 
Ukrainian may not be used as liturgical language. 
Despite the incessant harrassment by the police and slanderous 
propaganda attacks suffered by the banned Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church, 
the latter continues its activities in Galicia and the Transcarpatian oblast 
as well as in the areas of resettlement and deportation of West Ukrainians. 
While its exiled primate, Cardinal Josyf Slipy_i, resides in Rome, the Uniate 
flock is being served by several secretly or dained bishops 
and three to four hundred priests as well as several female and male monastic 
orders. The political and ecclesiastical "d�tente" which has characterized 
the Vatican-Moscow relations since the early 1960's while probably averting 
more severe soviet repressions, has severely tested the Uniates' loyalty to 
Rome and their Church's morale and cohesion. 
Lookings in retrospect at the effect of Soviet policies on religion 
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in the Ukraine one can list such regime "successes" as the establishment of 
effective external and internal controls over the Russian Orthodox Church, 
the Union of Evangelical Christians (and] Baptists, and other "loyal denomin­
ations; the suppression of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church; and 
the driving into the catacombs the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church. On the 
other hand, the regime failed, despite massive propaganda and police measures, 
to eliminate growing religious underground or to stem the tide of religious 
dissent. Neither were the Communist authorities entirely successful in 
their efforts to displace religiosity in society with the so-called "scientific 
atheism. " While the maiority of the Ukraine's population today may be con-
sidered areligious�8 secularization has been due more to the rapid socio­
economic and demographic changes than to the atheist indoctrination, though 
the permeation of the school curriculum with antireligious orientation un-
doubtedly has not been without effect on . children and youth. The problem 
is that secularization has also undermined the credibility of the official 
ideology, generating scepticism and pragmatism rather then "militant atheism." 
What more, the increasingly manifest linkage between atheist indoctrination 
and Russification ("internationalist education") in the Ukraine, has brought 
home to the nationally-conscious Ukrainians a much greater realization of the 
fundamental inter-dependence of traditional religion and national culture.� 
It is futile to speculate about the future fate of religion in the Soviet 
Ukraine beyond the obvious assumption that so long as the regime will continue 
to pursue its antireligious struggle without relenting on its monopoly of 
political and moral "truth", it will actually contribute to the survival of 
religion against the onslaught of modernization, as religion remains the only 
readily available, alternative belief-system, the sole stable set of moral 
values, and the unfalsified link with the nation's past. 
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N 0 T E S 
1. The Russian Orthodox Church (R.O. C.) or the Moscow Patriarchate headed 
again, since November 1917, by "Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus." In 
the Ukraine, a title of the "Patriarchal Exarch of the Entire Ukraine" 
has been attached to Kievan Metropolitans of the R.O.C. since August 
1921. 
2. Renovationism (Rus. obnovlenchestvo), an offshoot of the frustrated 
reform movement withing the R.O.C., which joined forces with the Soviet 
regime in 1922 to seize the central administration of the Russian Church. 
Comprising predominantly the "white" (married) clergy, the Renovationist 
movement sought to introduce "progressive" reforms in the Church, incl. 
the replacement of the Moscow Patriarchate with a synodical form of church 
government, to bring the Church doctrine and political orientation in line 
with Soviet policies and to purge the Church of "reactionaries", \vhile 
hoping to improve the legal and material position of the clergy under 
the Soviet regime. Though it enjoyed active support from the Soviet 
authorities, the Renovationist Church failed to attract any significant 
following among believers and was largely disowned by the authorities, after 
the Moscow Patriarchate was forced in 1927 into political submission to the 
regime. On the rise and fall of the Renovationist Church in the Soviet 
Ukraine, see this writer's "The Renovationist Church in the Soviet Ukraine, 
1922-19 39," in The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Science in the 
U.S., IX (19 61), No. 1-2 (27-28), 41-74. 
3. For the most extensive treatment of the UAOC available, see I. Vlasovskyi, 
Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, IV, Part I (New York-Bound 
Brook, 1961). 
4. See this writer's "Lenin and Religion," in L. Schapiro and P. Reddaway (eds.), 
Lenin--The Man, The Theorist, The Leader: A Reappraisal (London, 196 7), 
107-134. 
5. The preceding discussion largely summarizes this writer's "The Shaping of 
Soviet Religious Policy," Problems of Communism, XXII, No. 3 (May-June 1973), 
3 7-51. 
6. The All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council was first formed by the Ukrainian 
autocephalist movement in late fall 1917 to convene an All-L�rainian Church 
Sobor. It was re-established in 1919 and, with the movement's secession 
from the R.O.C. in May 1920, it assumed the leadership of the Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church. 
7. The Autocephalists were the first to recognize (and take advantage of) the 
new Soviet legislation on religion. 
8. Unilateral revision of Orthodox canons undertaken by the First All-Ukrainian 
Sobor of October 1921, incl. the indroduction of married episcopate and its 
consecration by Sobor, without canonically-ordained bishops, isolated the 
UAOC from all other Orthodox Churches and exposed it to condemnation by the 
R.O.C. as "schismatic" and "sectarian," while alienating from the new Church 
some of the original leaders of the Ukrainian national church movement. 
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9 .  Cf. Ivan Sukhopliuev, Ukrainski avtokefalisty (Kharkiv, 1925). 
10. The "Living Church"--the most radical and pro-Soviet of the several factions 
comprising the Renovationist movement, which led the 1922 attack on the 
Patriarchate. It lost control of the movement by 1923 to the more con­
servative wing of the movement--"The Union of Congregations of the Ancient 
Apostolic Church" (SODATs) led by A. Vvedenskii. 
11. In particular, the differences between supporters of radopraviie (conciliar, 
lay-dominated church government) and the more conservative episcopate of 
the UAOC. See Sukhopliuev, op. cit.; Vlasovskyi, £R· cit.; and Metropolitan 
Vasyl Lypkivskyi, Istoriia Ukrainskoi Tserkvy, Rozdil VII: Vidrodzhennia 
Ukrainskoi Tserkvy (Winnipeg, 1961). 
12. Though it declared itself "authocephalous" at its May 1925 Sober in Kharkiv, 
the Renovationist Church remained predominatly Russian and retained its 
membership in the Renovationist Holy Synod of the Orthodox Churches of the 
USSR; in December 19 34, the latter nullified the "authocephaly" of then 
moribund Renovationist Church in the Ukraine (A.A. Shishkin, Sushchnost 
i kriticheskaia otsenka 'obnovlencheskogo' raskola russkoi pravoslavnoi 
tserkvi [Kazan, 19 7Ql, 27 3) 
13. See Vlasovski, �· cit. 198, 207. 
14. At the peak of its influence, the UAOC might have had as many as three to 
six million followers. See Archbishop Iosif [Krechetovich], Proiskhozhdenie 
i sushchnost samosviatstva lipkovtsev (Kharkiv, 1925), 1; and Archbishop 
Serafim (Ladde), "Die Lage der Orthodoxen Kirche in der Ukraine," Eiche, 
X (19 31), No. 1, 11-40. 
15. See the communique of the GPU of the Ukr. SSR, in Izvestiia, Nov. 22, 1929. 
The alleged connection between the UAOC and the SVU appears to have been a 
crude fabrication on the part of the Soviet police and the procuracy, to 
provide a pretext for the suppression of the Church. 
16. The "Extraordinary Sober" was forced to condemn the fundamental principles 
of the UAOC: "it was completely logical that autocephaly should become a 
symbol of Petliurite independence, that Ukrainianization should be exploited 
as a means of inciting national enmity, and that conciliarism (sobornopravnist) 
should transform itself into a demagogical means of political influence " 
(emphasis supplied). D. Ihnatiuk, Ukrainska avtokefalna tserkva i Soiuz 
Vyzvolennia Ukrainy) (Kharkiv-Kiev, 1930), 30-31. 
17. Ibid. 
18. See the "Appeal" of the All-Ukrainian Church Provisional Organizational 
Committee" of June 9, 19 30 (Archive of Archbishop Ievhen Bachynskyi, 
Bulle, Switzerland). 
19. 
20. 
M. Iavdas (ed.), Materiialy do Pateryka Ukrainskoi Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy (Munich, 1951), 22-23. 
At the t�me of the Soviet invasion of Poland in Sept. 1939, there were only ��ur ac�1ve bishops left in the entire Russian Orthodox Church. For an 1nside account of the Moscow Patriarchate on the eve of World War II see Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresenskii), "Tserkov v SSSR pered voinoi :, in Rossiia (New York), Oct. 9-13, 1945. ' 
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21. The Sept. 4th meeting, attended by the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, 
Metropolitan Sergii, and Metropolitans Aleksii of Leningrad and 
Nikolai of Kiev, was followed by a succession of major concessions 
to the Russian Orthodox Church. 
22. See the Moscow Patriarchate's ukaz No. 167/a of March 1941, announcing 
the appointment of Archimandrite Panteleimon Rudyk as Bishop of Lviv 
for the solidly Uniate Galicia, to direct "reunification" efforts there. 
Such appointment, preceded by a visit of Metropolitan Nikolai Iarushevich 
to Lviv (Feb. 22-23, 1941), could not have occured without the approval 
of the Soviet authorities who, characteristically, wiped out Uniate 
missionar¥ organization in the Orthodox Volyn and Polissia. An original 
copy of the decree is held in the Museum Archive of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church in U.S.A. at South Bound Brook, N.J. (Prof. I. Vlasovskyi 
Archive, File No. 142). 
23. See Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's reports to the Holy See of August 30 and 
Nov. 7, 1941, reproduced in P. Blet et al., Actes et documents du Saint 
Siege relatifs a la seconde querre mondi;le, 7 vols. (Citta del Vaticano, 
1967-1973), Vol. 3, Part I, Nos. 297 and 324. 
24. The respective resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the 
USSR dated August 22, 1945, was announced to Patriarch Aleksii in a letter 
of August 28, 1945, from the Chairman of the Council for Affairs of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, G.G. Karpov. For the text of the letter (still 
unpublished in the USSR), see D. Loeber, "Die Rechtsstellung der Kirche 
in der Sowjetunion," in WGA--Die wichtigeten Gesetzgebungsakte in der 
Laender Ost-, Suedeuropas und in den ostasiatischen Volksdemokratien 
(Hamburg), VII, No. 5 (Oct. 1966), 272. Subsequently, in an unpublished 
decree of August 29, 1945, liberal taxation benefits were granted by 
the Council of People's Commissars to churches and monastic institutions 
(ibid., 274). 
25. For a more extensive account of the "reunion" campaign in Galicia and 
Transcarpathia, see this writer's "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: 
A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," Canadian Slavonic Papers, VII (1965), 
89-1 13; I, Hrynioch, "The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in 
the Soviet Union," Prologue (New York), Vol. IV (1960), 5-51; and, on 
Transcarpathia, V. Markus, Nyshchennia Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy v 
Mukachivskii eparkhii v 1945-1950 rr. (Paris, 1962). 
26. V. K. Tancher, Prychyny isnuvannia relihiinykh perezhytkiv v SRSR (Kiev, 
1959), 4; Vsesoiuznoe obshshestvo po rasprostraneniiu politicheskikh i 
nauchnykh znanii, Nauka i religiia (Moscow, 1957), 396. 
27. Secret CC Resolution "On Major Shortcomings in the Scientific-Atheist 
Propaganda and on Measures to Improve It" of July 7, 1954 (first published 
only in 1961); and published CC Resolution (signed by Khrushchev personally) 
"On Errors in the Conduct of the Scientific-Atheist Propaganda among the 
Population" of Nov. 10, 1954. 
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28. For some of the still unpublished Party and government orders and 
instructions of the two councils on religious affairs attached to 
the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which guided this antireligious 
campaign, see V. A. Kuroedov and A. S. Pankratov (eds.), Zakonodavstvo 
o religioznykh kultakh (Sbornik materialov i dokumentov), 2nd ed., rev. 
(Moscow, 1971) which was issued for internal (sluzhebnyi) use only; its 
equivalent in the Ukrainian SSR appeared two years later: K. z. Lytvyn 
and A. I. Pshenychnyi (eds.), Zakonodavstvo pro relihiini kulty 
(Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv) (Kiev, 1973). Characteristically, 
both Kuroedov and Lytvyn (who are chairmen of the Councils for Religious 
Affairs at the All-Union level and in the Ukrainian SSR, respectively) 
have recently published articles on the status of religious organizations 
in the Soviet Union which directly contradict some of the secret official 
documents reproduced in volumes they edited, documents which attest to 
the far reaching, arbitrary and discriminatory regime intervention into 
affairs of religious organizations. 
29. For a systematic discussion of religious dissent in the USSR, see this 
writer's testimony and prepared statement to U.S. House of Representatives, 
Subcommittees of International Political and Military Affairs and on 
International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations 
on June 24, 1976, and reproduced in the transcript of the Subcommittees' 
Hearings under the title Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union 
(Washington, D.C., 1976), 3-26. 
30. Ie. V. Safonova, Ideino-vykhovna robota Komunistychnoi partii sered 
trudiashchykh vyzvolenykh raioniv Ukrainy v roky Velykoi Vitchyznianoi 
viiny (1943-1945 rr.) (Kiev, 1971), 117. Citing a document from the 
Archive of the Institute of Party History, CC CPU, Safonova lists as 
of July 1, 1945, 6133 Orthodox churches and 2326 Uniate congregations 
(subsequently forced into the R.O.C.) within the Ukrainian SSR. 
3 1. K. Z. Lytvyn, "Svoboda sovisti--nevid'iemne pravo liudyny," Visti z Ukrainy, 
No. 15 (920), Apr. 1976. The figure appears to apply to 1966; the present 
total is likely to be lower. 
32. According to a confidential report for 1974 submitted to the CPscr Central 
Committee by V. D. Furov, vice-chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, 
the Russian Orthodox Church had by Jan. 1, 1975, 7,062 "registered" churches 
and only 5,994 "registered" priests and 594 deacons, i.e., 70.2 percent 
of the clergy it has had in 1961. The report was leaked to a Russian 
religious quarterly published in Paris. See "Iz otcheta Soveta po delam 
religii chlenam TsK KPSS," Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniia, 
Vol. 54, No. 130 (IV-1979), 289 , 297. 
33. As stated by Bishop Feodosii (Dykun) of Poltava in his appeal to L. I. 
Brezhnev of Oct. 26, 1977, in which he com�ined about the illegal 
interference of the oblast CRA plenipotentiary with the purely religious 
activities in the diocese and the plenipotentiary'e"administrative" methods 
of combating religion in violation of the constitutional "guarantees of the 
freedom of conscience". See "Zvernennia Iepyskopa Feodosiia do Brezhneva," 
Suchasnist, Vol. 21, Nos. 7-8 (July-Aug. 19 81), 160. 
34. Furov, "Iz otcheta Soveta," loc.cit., 317. 
35. Ibid., 300. 
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